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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THELMA B. STANTON, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES LAWRENCE STANTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This was respondent's motion for judgment against 
appellant for past due child support payments that accrued 
after the parties' daughter attained the age of eighteen 
years. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN TRIAL COURT 
The trial court entered judgment against defendant for 
the sum of $2,700.00, interest, and some costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the 
trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 29, 1960, the parties were granted a decree 
of divorce which required the father (appellant) to pay to 
the mother (respondent) $100.00 per month support payments 
for each of the parties' minor children. The parties have 
) 
) 
) CASE NO. 14268 
) 
) 
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two children, a daughter, Sherri, born February 12, 1953, 
and a son, Rick, born January 29, 1955. When Sherri became 
eighteen years of age on February 12, 1971, the father 
ceased making support payments on her behalf. 
On May 22, 1973, the mother filed a motion for entry of 
judgment against the father for $2,700.00 which represented 
the support money for Sherri which had accumulated since her 
eighteenth birthday. The trial court denied the motion on 
the ground that 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 set the age 
of majority for females at eighteen years, and that the 
decree's support obligation as to Sherri terminated on her 
eighteenth birthday. On appeal, this court held that the 
statute was valid and sustained the lower court's ruling. 
Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974). 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court was appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court which, on April 15, 1975, 
reversed the judgment and held that 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as applied in this case, was unconstitutional under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 
688 (1975). In its opinion the court stated: 
With the age differential held invalid, it is 
not for this court to determine when the appellee's 
obligation for his children's support, pursuant to 
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the divorce decree, terminates under Utah law. * * * 
This plainly is an issue of state law to be resolved 
by the Utah courts on remand; * * * . . 
On May 13, 1975, a mandate was issued by the United States 
Supreme Court, and the case was remanded to this court for 
proceedings in conformity with the United States Supreme 
Court1s decision. In its order of remand the United States 
Supreme Court awarded to the mother costs in the amount of 
$437.38 (R.3,4). 
On June 6, 197 5, plaintiff filed a motion with the Utah 
Supreme Court to determine at what age support obligations 
under a divorce decree end. This court declined to rule on 
the matter at that time, and remitted the case to the District 
Court of Salt Lake County for further proceedings (R.2). 
On September 10, 197 5, the Salt Lake County District Court 
entered judgment in favor of the mother and against the father 
for $2,7 00.00 in past due support money, $4 37.38 costs and 
$508.80 interest (R.15). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE LEGISLATURE HAS ENACTED A GENERAL POLICY THAT PARENTS 
HAVE A DUTY TO SUPPORT THEIR CHILDREN UNTIL THEY REACH THE AGE 
OF TWENTY-ONE YEARS. 
The sole issue presented for review by this court is 
whether support payments for the parties' daughter, Sherri, 
- 3 -
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continued beyond the age of eighteen years. 
There are presently two Utah statutes dealing directly 
with when the duty of parents to support their children 
terminates. The first is 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended, which provides: 
15-2-1. Period of minority - The period of 
minority extends in males and females to the age 
of eighteen years; but all minors obtain their 
majority by marriage. It is further provided that 
courts in divorce actions may order support to age 21. 
(Emphasis added) 
This statute has no direct application to the case at bar 
because it became effective after the present controversy 
arose. Its predecessor, which set the age of majority at 
eighteen for women and twenty-one for men, is not controlling 
because it was held invalid in the context of child support. 
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 
688 (1975), reversing 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974). 
However, the statute is pertinent because it manifests a policy 
of the legislature to permit divorce courts to order parents 
to support their children until the age of twenty-one. 
The second and more definitive statute pertaining to 
the duty of parents to support their children is the Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act (Title 78, Chapter 45, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953) which has direct application to this 
case. The statute provides in part: 
- 4 -
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78-45-2. Definitions. As used in this act: 
* * * 
(4) "Child" means a son or daughter under 
the age of 21 years and a son or daughter of 
whatever age who is incapacitated from earning 
a living and without sufficient means. 
• • . . . . • . . . . * * • * 
78-45-3. Duty of Man. Every man shall 
support his wife and his child. 
78-45-4. Duty of Woman. Every woman shall 
support her child; and she shall support her hus-
band when he is in need. 
Appellant in his brief cites at great length Utah 
statutes defining the age at which persons are permitted to 
engage in certain activities, i.e., enter into contracts, 
make wills, use firearms, drive automobiles, marry, commit 
crimes, open bank accounts, etc. The relevancy of these 
statutes is highly questionable inasmuch as Utah has three 
statutes defining "children" for the purpose of support, and 
all three indicate the support obligation does not cease 
until the twenty-first birthday. In addition to the Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act, the Public Assistance Act 
of 1961 (Title 55, Chapter 15a, Utah Code Annotated 1953) 
and the recently enacted Public Support of Children Act 
(Title 78, Chapter 45b, Utah Code Annotated 1953) terminate 
the support of children at twenty-one years of age. 
- 5 -
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The Public Assistance Act of 1961 provides in part: 
55-15a-17. Assistance shall be provided 
under this act for individuals who qualify as 
follows: 
(1) Persons in need, that 
(a) are children under the age of 21 and 
who have been deprived of natural parent or 
step-parent support or care * * * 
The Public Support of Children Act provides in part: 
78~45b-2. As used in this chapter: 
* * * 
(2) "Dependent child" means any person 
under the age of twenty-one who is not other-
wise emancipated, self-supporting, married, or 
a member of the armed forces of the United States. 
. • / • * * * 
II . • . 
A UTAH COURT IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING HAS AUTHORITY TO 
ORDER SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN UNTIL THE PARENTS LEGAL DUTY TO 
SUPPORT THEIR CHILDREN TERMINATES AT THE AGE OF TWENTY-ONE. 
Our Divorce statute, 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
at the time this proceeding was commenced, provided: 
When a decree of divorce is made, the 
court may make such orders in relation to the 
children, property and parties, and the main-
tenance of the parties and children, as may be 
equitable. The court shall have continuing jur-
isdiction to make such subsequent changes or new • 
orders with respect to the support and maintenance 
of the parties, the custody of the children and 
their support and maintenance, or the distribution 
of the property as shall be reasonable and nec-
essary. 
- 6 -
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In Dehm v, Dehmy decided January 14, 197 6, this court 
clarified the above statute in terms of when the court's jur-
isdiction to order child support ceases. In Dehm the trial 
court continued the father's obligation of child support 
indefinitely based on the specialized needs of the parties1 
retarded children. The father appealed on the basis that 
the term "children" as used in 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated 
1953 refers only to minor children. The court adapted the 
standards established in the Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act for authorizing child support for children in a 
divorce proceeding. The court stated: 
Since the term "children" has been neither 
limited nor defined by the legislature in Section 
30-3-5, a court in a divorce proceeding has the 
authority to order support for "children" so long 
as there is a legal duty on the part of the parents 
to so provide. 
In Chapter 45, Title 78, the legislature has 
set forth with specificity the duty of every man 
(78-45-3) and the duty of every woman (78-45-4) to 
support their children. Section 78-45-2(4), U.C.A. 
1953, as amended 1957, defines "child" as a 
son or daughter under the age of 21 years or 
a son or daughter of whatever age who is in-
capacitated from earning a living and without 
sufficient means. 
The Dehm decision clearly indicates that a court in a divorce 
proceeding should order parents to support their children 
until they attain age twenty-one in accordance with the leg-
islative policy of the state. 
- 7 -
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Ill 
INVALIDATION OF 15-2-1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
REINSTATED THE COMMON LAW AGE OF MAJORITY. 
At common law, the age of majority was twenty-one years 
for both males and females. Ann., "Age at which females 
attain majority,lf 95 A.L.R. 355; 42 Am.Jur.2d, Infants, §3. 
When 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 was enacted it abrogated 
the common law by lowering the age of majority for females 
to eighteen years. When the United States Supreme Court 
invalidated the classifications established in 15-2-1 Utah 
Code Annotated as discriminatory and a denial of equal pro-
tection in the context of child support, the common law age 
of majority was reinstated. In 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, §384 
this principle is stated: 
It is a general principle that the repeal of 
a statute which abrogates the common law op-
erates to reinstate the common-law rule, unless 
it appears the legislature did not intend such 
reinstatement. 
While the instant case technically does not involve a 
repeal but an invalidation of a statute, the basic principle 
remains the same. Furthermore, 68-3-1 Utah Code Annotated 
expressly provides that Utah adopt the common law as a rule 
of decision for the courts in this state, unless contrary to 
the Constitution or laws of the United States or Utah: 
- 8 -
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The common law of England so far as it is 
not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States,, or the 
Constitution or laws of this state, and so far 
only as it is consistent with and adapted to 
the natural and physical conditions of this 
state and the necessities of the people hereof, 
is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of de-
cision in all courts of this state. 
IV 
15-2-1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO 
BENEFIT THE EXCLUDED CLASS. 
When the United States Supreme Court held the statutory 
classification of 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 unconstitu-
tional this did not require a denial of the benefit to both 
classes. The benefit of the statute should be extended to 
the excluded class. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 
S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968); Moritz v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972); Harrigfeld 
v. District Court, 95 Idaho 540, 511 P.2d 822 (1973). 
Appellant seems to agree that benefits previously denied 
should be extended to the excluded class, but seeks to trans-
form the case into one dealing generally with the "benefits 
of emancipation". This case involves only child support. 
In the context of child support, construing the statute to 
benefit the excluded class requires continuing the support 
obligation of females until the age of twenty-one. It should 
- 9 -
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be noted, however, that although the statute should permit 
the support obligations to continue until age twenty-one, 
they do not necessarily continue until such time. As with 
males under the prior statute, when the child marries, 
leaves home, or otherwise becomes emancipated prior to the 
twenty-first birthday, the support obligation terminates. 
Even if it were determined (which it has not been) that 
at the time of the divorce the parties reasonably expected 
the support obligation for Sherri to terminate at age eighteen, 
the parties1 prior expectations are not sufficient justification 
to construe the statute to deny Sherri support payments from 
her father. In the leading case of Rosher v. Superior Court, 
9 Cal.2d 556, 71 P.2d 918 (1937) the California Supreme 
Court held that a statute raising the age of majority of 
females from eighteen to twenty-one could be properly applied 
to extend the child support obligation of a father under a 
decree of divorce entered prior to the effective date of 
such legislation. The court stated: 
[I]t cannot be said that any vested right 
with regard to his duty to support or care for 
his minor children is acquired by a divorced 
parent as a result of the divorce decree or 
custody orders made in connection therewith. 
Hence no such right is impaired by holding 
that the entry of a divorce decree or the mak-
ing of a custody or support order does not °P~ 
erate to limit the petitioner's liability to 
his minor child to the period of minority fixed 
by the statute at the time of the entry of the 
- 10 -
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decree, his obligation would continue throughtout 
the extended period of minority. The divorce de-
cree and support order neither separately nor in 
conjunction constitute a permanent and final ad-
judication of the extent of his obligation to 
support his minor child. 
For similar cases see State v. Kiessenbeck, 167 Ore.25, 114 
P.2d 147 (1941); Irby v. Martin, 500 P.2d 278 (Okla. 1972). 
And in two cases cited by appellant, the expectations of 
the parties was not considered to be of importance. Phelps 
v. Phelps, 85 N.M.62, 509 P.2d 254 (1973), and Jungjohann 
v. Jungjohann, 516 P.2d 904 (Kan. 1973). 
CONCLUSION 
The paramount concern of this court is not with the 
mother or father but with the child whose nurture and ed-
ucation are of significant state interest. As an expression 
of this interest the legislature has provided in the Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act, the Public Assistance Act 
of 1961 and the Public Support of Children Act, that the 
obligation of parents, and society in general, is to support 
children, male and female, until they reach twenty-one years 
of age. With this same interest in mind the provisions of 
15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 were amended to authorize 
divorce courts to order support to age twenty-one while at 
the same time providing that persons attain majority at age 
- 11 -
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eighteen. The support and maintenance obligations of 
divorce decrees must be coextensive with the general par-
ental obligation and this court has so held in the case 
of Dehm v. Dehm. 
With the invalidation of 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, the support obligation extends to the age of twenty-
one years under common law principles and 78-45-3 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. The trial court properly ruled the support 
obligation continued to age twenty-one, and that decision 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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